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Comments
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Foreign
Ownership of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in
the United States
What impact does the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
have on a possible venture between a United States corporation
and a foreign corporation to develop, construct, operate, and own a
commercial nuclear power plant in the United States?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("the Act" or "the AEA") prohibits any person or entity from owning or operating a commercial
nuclear power plant in the United States unless the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("the NRC" or "the Commission") issues a license pursuant to Section 101 of the Act.' Section
103 of the AEA prohibits the issuance of a license to "an alien or
any corporation or other entity" that is "owned, controlled, or
dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government."2 The NRC also has the discretion to refuse to issue a license to any person or entity if, in the opinion of the Commission,
issuance would be "inimical to the common defense and security."'
Any type of joint venture, partnership, or parent-subsidiary arrangement between a domestic corporation and a foreign corporation to own and operate a nuclear power plant in the United States
must satisfy the NRC's license requirements, technical, financial,
and managerial qualifications, and demonstrate that the public
health and safety and the environment will be adequately protected during construction and operation.4
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1982).
3. Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. Subparts I - XVIII; Energy, 10 C.F.R. Chapter 1, Nuclear Regulatory
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THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

A. Nuclear Power Plants
The AEA and the NRC regulations implementing the AEA classify a commercial nuclear power plant as a "utilization facility."
The AEA defines a utilization facility as:
Any equipment or device, except an atomic weapon, determined by rule of
the Commission to be capable of making use of special nuclear material in
such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security,
or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public.'

The NRC regulations define a utilization facility as "any nuclear
reactor other than one designed or used primarily for the formation of plutonium or U-233."'
To construct and operate any utilization facility within the
United States, a party must obtain the necessary licenses from the
NRC. 7 The NRC has a two-step procedure for licensing nuclear
power plants. First, the license applicant must obtain a construction permit to build the reactor.' Second, when construction is
substantially completed, the license applicant must obtain an operating license to operate the reactor."
B. License Restrictions
The AEA prohibits:
any person within the United States to transfer or receive in interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, use, import, or export any utilization .. .facility except under and in accordance with a license issued by the Commission pursuant to section 2133 or 2134.0

The NRC regulations similarly prohibit any "person within the
United States [to] transfer or receive in interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, or use any

. . .

utili-

zation facility except as authorized by a license issued by the
Commission.""
A nuclear reactor which would be used for commercial purposes
Commission.

5. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc) (1982).
6. Definition, 10 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1989).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (1982); Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R. Part 50; 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(a) (1989).
8. License Required, 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(b) (1989).
9. Issuance of Operating License, 10 C.F.R. § 50.57 (1989).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (1982).
11. License Required, 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(a) (1989).
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to generate power for sale or resale would be licensed pursuant to
Section 103. Section 103 of the AEA, governing commercial licenses,12 contains specific restrictions concerning foreign participation in NRC licensed activities. Section 103(d) specifically
provides:
No license may be issued to an alien or any corporation or other entity if
the Commission knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled, or
dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation,or a foreign government. In
any event, no license may be issued to any person within the United States
if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to such person
would be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and
safety of the public. 3

The NRC is therefore prohibited from directly issuing a commercial reactor license to any foreign entity, as well as any entity
which is "owned, controlled, or dominated by" a foreign entity.
Under Section 103(d), the NRC is also prohibited from issuing a
commercial reactor license to any entity if the NRC determines
that license issuance would be "inimical to the common defense
and security" of the United States. The NRC regulation which implements Section 103(d) specifically provides:
any person who is a citizen, national, or agent of a foreign country, or any
corporation, or other entity which the Commission knows or has reason to
believe is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government, shall be ineligible to apply for and obtain a
license.14

The NRC also requires all co-owners of commercial reactors to
be licensees, even if the co-owners have no operational responsibilities.1 5 The NRC, therefore, prohibits a foreign corporation from
being a direct owner or even a co-owner of a domestic commercial
reactor. However, NRC caselaw illustrates that this prohibition
does not preclude a foreign corporation, or one of its subsidiaries,
from owning an interest in an NRC licensee which actually owns or
operates a reactor.
While seemingly straightforward, neither the AEA or the NRC
12. Section 104 of the AEA governs research and development licenses. 42 U.S.C. §
2134 (1982).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1982) (emphasis added). Section 104(d) of the Act contains an
identical provision applicable to R&D reactors licensed pursuant to that section. 42 U.S.C. §
2134(d) (1982).
14. Ineligibility of Certain Applicants, 10 C.F.R. § 50.38 (1989).
15. Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill 1 and 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179,
200-201 (1978).
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regulations provide any substantive criteria or guidance to determine what type of foreign participation might constitute "foreign
ownership, control, or domination" or what type of circumstances
might be "inimical to the common defense and security."
C. Legislative History
The legislative history of the AEA does not provide any guidance for interpreting Section 103(d). An earlier draft of the AEA
included an even more restrictive provision than the one adopted
in Section 103(d). This earlier provision would have prohibited any
United States corporation or association from obtaining a license
if:
it is owned or controlled by a foreign corporation or government, or if more
than 5 per centum of its voting stock is owned or voted by aliens or their
representatives, or if more than 5 per centum of its members are aliens, or if
any officer, director, or trustee is not a citizen of the United States.",

Several objections were raised with respect to the inclusion of this
provision including:
(1) that similar provisions in other regulatory statutes, such as the Federal
Communications Act, permit foreign nationals to own a 20-25 percent interest in U. S. licensees,
(2) that a domestic U.S. corporation cannot feasibly prevent foreign nationals from purchasing five percent of its stock, and
(3) that it is difficult and expensive for a domestic U.S. corporation to constantly keep track of the identity and nationality of all of its shareholders
to assure compliance with this requirement."

This provision was deleted from the final draft without any additional explanation. Section 103(d) was subsequently passed without any quantitative restrictions on foreign ownership or control.
III.
A.

SECTION 103: FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, OR DOMINATION

Commission Decisions and Advisory Letters

The Commission and its staff have issued a series of decisions
and advisory letters which construe the "foreign ownership, control, or domination" provision of the AEA and the NRC regulations. These decisions provide the criteria for interpreting this
provision.
The first Commission decision construing the "foreign owner16. Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act, pp. 1961-1962.
17. Id. at 1962, 1968.
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ship, control, or domination" provision was the General Electric
Company and Southwest Atomic Energy Associates case
("SEFOR"). s In SEFOR, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
("ASLB") of the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC"), the predecessor to the NRC, granted a conditional construction permit to
the General Electric Company ("GE") and the Southwest Atomic
Energy Associates ("SAEA"), an association of electric utility companies organized under Arkansas law. The conditional construction
permit permitted GE and SAEA to construct the SEFOR test reactor as part of the AEC's fast breeder reactor program.19
The ASLB then suspended the SEFOR construction permit on
the ground that a contract between SAEA and Gesellschaft fur
Kernforschung ("GFK"), a non-profit association formed under
the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, violated the prohibition against foreign ownership, control, or domination contained in
the AEA.2 The contract between the SAEA and GFK provided
that GFK would contribute 50% of the construction costs of the
SEFOR reactor, participate in project review and technical policy
committees, designate scientists and engineers to participate in the
design and construction of SEFOR, subject to the approval and
direction of GE, and be consulted on matters of policy and questions affecting costs.2"
On review, the AEC reinstated the construction permit holding
that "it does not know or have reason to believe that SAEA and/or
General Electric are owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a
foreign corporation, or a foreign government, and that issuance of
a construction permit will not be inimical to the common defense
and security."2 2 In support of its holding, the AEC found that
GFK did not have: (1) stock in GE or SAEA, (2) a say in the management, hiring, supervision, or dismissal of GE or SAEA employees on the SEFOR project, (3) a voice in the day to day activities
of the project, (4) legal ownership or interest in SEFOR's physical
assets, (5) a right to use or direct the use of any SEFOR physical
assets, and (6) a voice in the financial affairs of GE or SAEA. 23 The
18. 3 AEC 99 (1966).
19. General Electric Company and Southwest Atomic Energy Associates, 3 AEC 40,
41 (1965).
20. General Electric Company and Southwest Atomic Energy Associates, 3 AEC 96
(1966).
21. Id.
22. General Electric Company and Southwest Atomic Energy Associates, 3 AEC 99,
102-103 (1966).
23. Id. at 101.
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AEC concluded that GFK did not possess the rights and powers
which are indicative of ownership, control, or domination.24 The
AEC, therefore, permitted a foreign interest to indirectly participate in the construction of a United States commercial nuclear
power plant through a contractual arrangement.
In its SEFOR decision, the AEC indicated that Congress intended to prohibit situations in which a foreign entity would have
the power to direct the actions of a United States licensee. The
AEC interpreted the phrase "owned, controlled, or dominated" to
mean a situation where "the will of one party was subjugated to
the will of another" with potential adverse implications "toward
safeguarding the national defense and security."2 5 As a result, the
AEC determined that issuance of a construction permit was not
prohibited by the statutory bar against foreign ownership, control,
or domination.2 6 The NRC later characterized GFK's participation
in the SEFOR project as that of a capital contributor and consultant with no direct or indirect ownership interest in the NRC licenses, the actual NRC licensees (GE and SAEA), or the project
facilities.2 7
In 1973, the AEC expanded the policy it set forth in SEFOR
when it permitted the Gulf Oil Corporation ("Gulf") to transfer
various nuclear facilities to a newly formed partnership, the General Atomic Company ("General Atomic"). Gulf and Scallop Nuclear Inc. each owned a 50% share of General Atomic. Scallop Nuclear, Inc. was a Delaware corporation whose shares were owned
via several intermediate corporations including Royal Dutch Petroleum, a Netherlands company, and Shell Transport and Trading, a
24. Id. The Commission specifically concluded that:
The board erred in failing to take into consideration the many aspects of corporate
existence and activity in which control or domination by another would normally be
manifested in giving undue significance to the voice and influence afforded contractually to Gesellschaft in the matters of participation in project planning and review of
program execution. The ability to restrict or inhibit compliance with the security and
other regulations of the AEC, and the capacity to control the use of nuclear fuel and
to dispose of special nuclear material generated in the reactor, would be of great
significance.

Id.
25. Id. at 103.
26. In Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), 4 AEC 231
(1969), the AEC affirmed the continued validity of its SEFOR decision. It noted that "if a
domestic public utility corporation were subject to alien direction, . . . there would be manifestations of this in the corporation organization and management ...." Id. at 233.
27. See Letter from N.J. Palladino, Chairman of the NRC, to Senator Alan Simpson,
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, with attached OELD Legal Analysisof Foreign Control and Domination (September 22, 1983).
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British company."
The assets transferred by Gulf to General Atomic included licenses for three TRIGA research reactors and the Barnwell spent
fuel reprocessing plant. The licenses for the TRIGA research reactors were subject to Section 104 of the AEA, while the licenses for
the Barnwell spent fuel reprocessing plant were subject to Section
103 of the AEA.
Before approving the license transfers to General Atomic, the
AEC imposed certain conditions to assure that the operations and
activities of General Atomic would be free from foreign control.
Specifically, the AEC imposed the following conditions:
(1) the president and any officers of the partnership having direct responsibility for the control, and any employees having direct custody of, special
nuclear material must be U.S. citizens.
(2) a separate department of General Atomic must be responsible for special
nuclear material, and the head of the department must report directly to
the president.
(3) the president shall be charged with the responsibility and exclusive authority of ensuring that the business and activities of the partnership are at
all times conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of the common defense and security of the United States.
(4) the foregoing conditions apply to the partnership and any entities in
which the partnership shall have voting control.
(5) General Atomic will not change any of the foregoing conditions without
approval of the Director of Regulation of the AEC or of the person holding
any equivalent successor position.2 9

The AEC, therefore, permitted two foreign entities to purchase an
indirect ownership interest in several AEC domestic utilization facility licenses.
In 1983, in response to a congressional inquiry, the NRC's Office
of the Executive Legal Director ("OELD") conducted an analysis
of the statutory prohibitions and the corresponding AEC/NRC
caselaw on foreign ownership and control with respect to NRC license issuance. 30 The OELD's analysis was prompted by the proposed transfer of an NRC license for an isotope-producing research
reactor from a subsidiary of Union Carbide to Cintichem, Inc.
("Cintichem"). Union Carbide was a domestic corporation while
28. Letter from Atomic Energy Commission to General Atomic Company, re: Approval
of License Transfer (December 14, 1973).
29. N.J. Palladino, supra note 22, p. 7-8.
30. OELD Legal Analysis, "Legal Questions of Foreign Control and Domination
Raised by Proposed Transfer of Facility License no. R-81 from Union Carbide "B", Inc. to
Cintichem, Inc." (1983).
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Cintichem was a Delaware corporation whose ultimate parent was
F. Hoffman-LaRoche and Co., Ltd., a Swiss corporation.
The Commission concluded that it "has reason to believe" that
the proposed transferee was owned, controlled, or dominated by an
alien or foreign corporation and that the transfer would therefore
be barred, without any need to consider whether the foreign ownership, control, or domination would be inimical to the common
defense or security. 1 The NRC based its initial resolution of the
Cintichem case on an obvious interpretation of the plain wording
of the statute. Its interpretation illustrates that foreign corporations, and even domestic corporations which are wholly-owned by a
foreign corporation, are prohibited from directly owning or obtaining an NRC license for a nuclear reactor in the United States.
In response to the Commission's adverse decision, Congress
added a rider to the NRC's 1984 Authorization Bill 32 permitting
the NRC to transfer this specific license to an entity owned or controlled by a foreign corporation if:
(a) the NRC could find that the transfer would not be inimical to the common defense and security, and
(b) the NRC included in the license such conditions as it deemed necessary
to ensure that the foreign corporation could not direct the actions of the
licensee in ways that would be inimical to the common defense and
security."

After the special legislation was passed, the NRC conditionally
approved the Cintichem transfer. The transfer was subject to General Atomic type conditions, with the additional requirement that:
(1) all of the directors of Cintichem had to be United States citizens unless otherwise approved by the NRC; (2) any actions by
Switzerland or changes in Swiss law which would affect ownership
or control of Cintichem had to be reported immediately to the
NRC; and (3) only individuals with security clearances were permitted to have access to Restricted Data. The Cintichem case illustrates that the only way a foreign entity can obtain an ownership interest in a United States commercial nuclear power plant is
by special congressional legislation.
While the Cintichem case does not provide any additional guidance concerning the amount of foreign ownership, control, or domination which may be permissible beyond that previously estab31.
32.
33.

Id.
P.L. 98-55, § 109 (1984).
Id.
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lished in the General Atomic case, it does however provide
additional guidance concerning the restrictions on foreign participation which may be necessary to satisfy the NRC's "not inimical
to the common defense and security requirement" of the NRC. Although the statutory prohibition on foreign ownership and control
in Section 103(d) is closely related to with the separate statutory
requirement in Section 103(d) relating to the common defense and
security, the Cintichem case demonstrates that, even in situations
where foreign ownership and control is permissible, the Commission will still examine whether license issuance will be inimical to
the common defense and security and may impose additional conditions to satisfy this requirement.
The General Atomic case supports the proposition that Section
103(d) of the Act does not preclude foreign ownership of up to a
50% interest in a United States venture as long as appropriate
conditions are imposed. However, this proposition does not mean
that the conditions imposed in GeneralAtomic and Cintichem will
necessarily satisfy both of the statutory requirements contained in
Section 103(d). The SEFOR case demonstrates that even where
foreign interests have no share in the ownership of the licensee or
the facility the Commission must be satisfied that domestic United
States interests will actually control the project and will comply
with the applicable regulatory requirements for the control of nuclear fuel, special nuclear material, and Restricted Data.
B. Transfer of
Corporations

Corporate

Control

Between

Domestic

The Commission has addressed the concept of corporate control
with respect to a direct or indirect transfer of a license from one
United States corporation to another. Although not involving foreign interests, these decisions suggest that the threshold for "control" may be an ownership interest of less than 50%.
In 1977, Babcock & Wilcox ("B&W"), an NRC licensee, asked
the NRC to obtain a court injunction prohibiting a hostile tender
offer for B&W's controlling stock by United Technologies Corporation ("United"). B&W asserted that under Section 184 of the
AEA 3 NRC involvement was required because United's acquisition of B&W would constitute a prohibited transfer of control of
B&W's licenses without NRC approval.3 5 The NRC rejected
34.
35.

42 U.S.C. § 2234 (1982).
Section 184 of the AEA provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o license granted
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B&W's request stating that although it did not want to get involved "in a whirlpool of corporate litigation," a transfer of "effective control" of a licensee does constitute a transfer of a license
within the meaning of Section 184.36 The NRC indicated that its
three major concerns in connection with the grant of a license or a
license transfer were: (1) whether the applicant is financially stable
and responsible, (2) whether the applicant will employ technically
competent personnel, and (3) whether the applicant is under foreign domination or control or whether the common defense or security might otherwise be harmed.
While refusing to take action in the B&W/United litigation, the
NRC requested to be kept informed of its progress. The NRC subsequently notified United:
Obviously, you may reach the conclusion that United will be able to exercise
effective control over B&W even without having acquired a fifty percent
stock interest in the operation. Our firm expectation is that you will take no
step to implement any such conclusion before seeking the necessary authorization from the Commission."

This notification indicates that NRC approval would be required
before "effective control" could be exercised by United. In the case
of a publicly-held domestic corporation, the NRC appears to recognize that "effective control" may exist even if a corporation has an
ownership interest below 50%. Regardless of the ownership interest, the NRC will examine every aspect of the relationship between
the venture participants when assessing whether foreign domination or control exists.
IV.

SECTION

103: NOT INIMICAL TO THE COMMON DEFENSE AND
SECURITY

A.

Commission Decisions and Advisory Letters

The NRC has continuously exercised its discretionary authority
with respect to interpreting and applying the AEA's prohibition
against license issuance which would be "inimical to the common
hereunder . . . shall be transferred, assigned or in any manner disposed of, .

. through

transfer of control of any license to any person, unless the Commission .. .shall give its

consent in writing. 42 U.S.C. § 2234 (1982).
36. Letter from Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Babcock & Wilcox, re: NRC response to B&W's inquiry concerning the Atomic Energy Act and a transfer of effective control (May 9, 1977).
37. Letter from Nuclear Regulatory Commission to United Technologies Corporation,
re: NRC approval necessary before any transfer in ownership from B&W to United may
occur (June 7, 1977) (emphasis added).
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defense and security." Although the legislative history of the AEA
is sparse with respect to this statutory prohibition, the NRC has
addressed the common defense and security requirement in several
licensing decisions.
In Florida Power & Light Company (Turkey Point Units 3 and
4) ("FP&L"), 35 the AEC described the not inimical to the common
defense and security requirement as assuring "the safeguarding of
special nuclear material; the absence of foreign control over the applicant; the protection of Restricted Data; and the availability of
special nuclear material for defense needs. 3' 9 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in affirming
the AEC's issuance of a construction permit for the Turkey Point
units, indicated that this requirement included "such things as not
allowing the new industrial needs for nuclear materials to preempt
the requirements of the military; of keeping such materials in private hands secure against loss or diversion; and of denying such
materials and classified information to persons whose loyalties
were not to the United States. ' '4°
The emphasis on the availability of special nuclear material
("SNM"), i.e. plutonium, U-233, and enriched uranium, for defense needs in these decisions is partly due to the fact that when
these decisions were rendered, the AEC was responsible not only
for the regulation of commercial nuclear reactors, but also for the
production of SNM for the Department of Defense. When the
NRC was established in 1974, it only assumed the AEC's regulatory responsibilities while the Energy Research and Development
Administration ("ERDA") assumed the AEC's non-regulatory
functions."1
Certain information and data pertaining to a new nuclear power
plant design may be classified as Restricted Data4 2 under Depart38. 4 AEC 9 (1967).
39. Id. at 12-13.
40. Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F.2d 778, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The court
concluded that an applicant has to establish that the proposed facility is secure "against his
own treachery, negligence, or incapacity," but does not have to establish that the proposed
facility is secure against "whatever destructive forces a foreign enemy might be able to direct against it." Id.
41. Under the Energy Reorganization Act if 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq., the nonregulatory functions of the AEC, such as the promotion of nuclear power, R&D activities,
and SNM production for the DOD weapons programs, were transferred to the Energy Research and Development Administration ("ERDA"). These functions were subsequently
transferred to the Department of Energy ("DOE") when it was established in 1977 under
the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et seq. (1982).
42. The AEA and the NRC regulations defines "Restricted Data" as "all data concern-
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ment of Energy (DOE) and NRC regulations.' Under AEA,"
NRC,' 5 and DOE 6 regulations, access to Restricted Data is limited
to those persons and entities "within or under the jurisdiction of
the United States. 4' 7 Applicants for an NRC license must agree
"not to permit any individual to have access to Restricted Data"
until an administrative determination is made that such access
"will not endanger the common defense and security" and the necessary access permits and security clearances have been obtained. 8
These requirements can probably be met through the imposition of
appropriate license conditions requiring that the requisite security
clearances and access permits be obtained before any Restricted
Data involving the new plant technology is disclosed to any venture participant who is not authorized to have access to such
data."9
In a more recent decision, the NRC approved the proposed
transfer of a controlling interest in Exxon Nuclear, a Delaware corporation, to Kraftwerk Union AG ("KWU") and a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Siemans AG, two corporations organized under the
laws of the Federal Republic of Germany. Since the NRC licenses
held by Exxon Nuclear were for nuclear materials, and not for a
production or utilization facility, the statutory prohibition against
foreign ownership, control, or domination was not involved, but the
ing (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special
nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but
42
shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category .
U.S.C. § 2014(y); 10 C.F.R. § 725.3(h).
43. 10 C.F.R. Part 725, App. A, C-44 Nuclear Technology.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2165 (a) (1989).
45. 10 C.F.R. § 95.35 (1989).
46. 10 C.F.R. § 725.2 (1989).
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2165(a) (1982); 10 C.F.R. § 95.35 (1989); 10 C.F.R. § 725.2 (1989). See
also 10 C.F.R. Parts 10 and 25. While foreign corporations and foreign nationals are not
eligible to apply for access permits under DOE's regulations, partnerships and other business ventures which include U.S. corporations and have U.S. citizens as their principal officers are eligible. 10 C.F.R. § 725.12 (1989).
49. The AEC has indicated that Restricted Data includes all information satisfying
the statutory definition whether or not it is generated under sponsorship of the U.S. government or by a person within, or under the jurisdiction of the United States. Such information
was considered "born classified" and once it was brought into the United States or conveyed
to a U.S. citizen, the AEC considered it to be Restricted Data subject to regulation under
the Act. See e.g., Testimony of AEC General Counsel William Mitchell, Hearings before a
Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations on
S.J.Res. 21, to Establish A Commission on Government Security, 84 Cong. 1st Sess., 2658270 (1955). This interpretation was apparently never challenged in Congress or in the
Courts, although the AEC did back off of this position in subsequent rulemakings.
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license transfer still had to satisfy the not "inimical to the common
defense and security" requirement.
In seeking the NRC's consent to the transfer, but without conceding that such consent was necessary, Exxon Nuclear stated that
control by KWU would not be inimical to the common defense and
security because, among other things, prior to the closing date, Exxon Nuclear would divest itself of all interests in DOE classified
contracts and would transfer to another entity all of its intellectual
property rights in various types of Restricted Data. In addition,
Exxon Nuclear would remain a Delaware corporation and indicated that the current directors and principal operating officers, all
of whom were United States citizens, would remain in office; that
there would be no change in the fundamental materials control
program or in the plans for physical security of the facilities or for
the physical protection of SNM in transit. Exxon Nuclear also
noted that the Federal Republic of Germany is a signatory of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is a member of Euratom.
The NRC approved the transfer without comment or imposition of
additional conditions." The NRC thus permitted two foreign entities to obtain a controlling interest over NRC issued nuclear
materials licenses.
Any proposed venture between a domestic entity and a foreign
entity must satisfy the AEA's common defense and security requirement. The necessary assurances concerning the safeguarding
of SNM and the absence of foreign control can presumably be obtained through the imposition of the General Atomic/Cintichem
conditions. However, before obtaining an NRC license, the DOE
and the venture participants must provide the NRC with appropriate assurances that any possible impact on the availability of SNM
for defense needs or access to Restricted Data which the joint domestic and foreign development of a new nuclear power plant
might create have been considered, analyzed, and accommodated.
V.

CONCLUSION

The NRC permits foreign participation in NRC licensed activities if the license applicants can demonstrate that foreign entities
do not hold a majority interest in the venture and that the licensed
50. Letter from Exxon Nuclear to NRC re: NRC Consent to Proposed License Transfer, If Required (Oct. 10, 1986).
51. Letter from NRC to Exxon Nuclear re: Approval of Materials Lucine Transfer
(Oct. 28, 1986).
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activities will be conducted under the direction and control of
United States citizens. While allowing foreign participation, the
NRC imposes various license conditions which limit the amount of
foreign ownership over the applicant and the nature and extent of
the foreign participation in the applicant's licensed activities.
These license conditions have included, but are not limited to: (1)
the foreign interest should not hold more than a 50% ownership
interest in the venture, (2) the board of directors, or other
equivalent executive or management committee of the venture,
should be comprised primarily of United States citizens who are
not under the influence or control of the foreign interest, (3) the
chief executive officer and chief operating officer of the venture
should be United States citizens who are free from such influence
and control, (4) other officers and employees of the venture who
have responsibility for the custody and control of special nuclear
materials should be United States citizens, and (5) all directors,
officers, and employees who have access to Restricted Data involving plant technology should have the necessary security clearances
and access permits. Although the NRC might impose less stringent
conditions on a foreign entity seeking to develop, construct, own,
and operate a commercial nuclear power plant in the United States
than those imposed in General Atomic/Cintichem, it seems more
likely that additional conditions would be imposed. These additional conditions would probably involve the control of SNM and
Restricted Data relating to the new plant design. The conditions
the NRC might actually impose on a foreign interest which seeks
to own a portion of a United States domestic nuclear power plant
depend on the form of the venture and the nature and extent of
the participation by other parties.
The NRC has laid the groundwork for permitting foreign participation in NRC licensed activities. Its present policies and precedents permit foreign ownership in an NRC licensee and foreign
participation in NRC licensed activities. A natural expansion of
NRC policy and precendent will permit partial and direct, albeit
conditional, foreign ownership in United States commercial nuclear power plants. If the NRC wants to prohibit foreign entities
from obtaining an ownership interest in domestic commercial nuclear power plants, the NRC must review and revise its present
policies.
Katherine J. Palmer

